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Response
Vermeule Unbound
Philip Hamburger*
My book asks Is Administrative Law Unlawful? Adrian Vermeule
answers “No.”1 In support of his position, he claims that my book does not
really make arguments from the U.S. Constitution, that it foolishly
denounces administrative power for lacking legislative authorization, that it
grossly misunderstands this power and the underlying judicial doctrines,
and ultimately that I argue “like a child.”2
My book actually presents a new conception of administrative power,
its history, and its unconstitutionality; as Vermeule has noted elsewhere, it
offers a new paradigm.3 Readers therefore should take seriously the
arguments against the book. They also, however, should recognize that the
book unavoidably has provoked a strong reaction. The question here,
therefore, is whether Vermeule’s heated denunciation is more revealing
about the book or about the difficulty of defending administrative power.
The answer becomes apparent from Vermeule’s repeated false or
otherwise misplaced claims, which I will discuss as follows:
• I. My Arguments. Vermeule does not accurately describe my
arguments, and this Response therefore begins by summarizing them.
• II. Mischaracterization. Vermeule repeatedly mischaracterizes my
* Maurice and Hilda Friedman Professor of Law, Colombia Law School.
1. Adrian Vermeule, No, 93 TEXAS L. REV. 1547 (2015) (reviewing PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014)).
2. Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1567.
3. See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The New Coke: On the Plural Aims of
Administrative Law, SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 1),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2631873 [perma.cc/6EB8-Y9FM]
(referring to Thomas Kuhn’s notion of “normal science” and the challenges to it).
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arguments. Criticism does not ordinarily provoke me to respond; in
fact, I have never before bothered to answer an academic book
review. Vermeule, however, denies that I make my central
arguments and attributes to me arguments that I do not make. He
even attributes to me arguments that are the very opposite of my
positions and that I expressly reject.
• III. Not a Nutshell. Although my book offers a new approach to
administrative power, Vermeule evaluates it as if it were a
Nutshell—as if a book presenting a novel vision of administrative
power must parse doctrines and cases in the manner of an
introductory summary for students.
• IV. Historical Errors. In disparaging my historical arguments,
Vermeule misstates history, making serious errors about both the
English and the American evidence.
• V. Personal Attacks. He indulges in personal attacks, including ad
hominems, accusations of extremism, and what look like attempts to
police dissent.
These are not the entirety of the problems with Vermeule’s review, but they
are enough to suggest its character. Such a review says little about my
book. More seriously, it fails to confront the realities of administrative
power and the realities of the objections to it. It thus distracts attention
from the real debate about administrative power.
At stake is not merely my book and Vermeule’s critique. More
fundamentally, there is a choice between the republican form of
government established by the U.S. Constitution and the absolute power
that, although once defeated by the Constitution, has reemerged within our
republic.
My critique of administrative power relies on the history of absolute
power to inform an understanding of the U.S. Constitution. Throughout the
history of the common law, absolute power has repeatedly threatened the
ideal of rule through and under law. Beginning in the seventeenth century,
constitutions therefore rejected absolute power, and no constitution barred it
more systematically than the U.S. Constitution. Absolute power, however,
survived on the Continent, most notably in Germany, where it was
unimpeded by constitutional law and increasingly took administrative form.
And from the Continent, especially Germany, this dangerous power
eventually (in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries) was
reintroduced into common law countries. On the basis of this history, my
book shows the danger of absolute power, the value of constitutional
barriers to it, and in particular how it violates the U.S. Constitution.
Vermeule, in contrast, has defended administrative power from the
traditions of German absolutism. In particular, he has made arguments
from the inevitability or necessity of unbound executive power; he has
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made Schmittian arguments about exceptions from law; he has made
arguments for the separation of functions in place of the separation of
powers; he has made arguments that the executive merely specifies laws
and thus is not legislating. Of course, just because Vermeule echoes these
German absolutist arguments is not to say that he self-consciously is
embracing this tradition; the Supreme Court also makes some such
arguments and also is largely unaware of their origin and tendency.
Nonetheless, as explained in my book, the defense of administrative power
of the sort made by Vermeule carries forward a dubious intellectual
heritage.
The choice is thus very serious, and it deserves sober debate.
Vermeule, however, heads in another direction. He repeatedly makes
false or otherwise misplaced claims, and he thereby defends what he has
espoused as unbound power in a thoroughly unbound manner.4 Even this,
however, is interesting, for it reveals the indefensible nature of the power he
so desperately seeks to defend. Administrative power must be unlawful if
this is its best defense against my book.
I.

My Arguments

My book makes layers of arguments against administrative power—
most basically, a series of conceptual, historical, and, more narrowly,
constitutional claims. These arguments do not fall neatly into conventional
patterns of originalist or doctrinal scholarship, and precisely because of
their new angle on administrative power, they dislodge many familiar
assumptions about it.5
A.

Concepts: Absolute Power
Conceptually, the book shows that administrative power is what used

4. For purposes of understanding Vermeule’s earlier scholarship, unbound means unlimited
by law. See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 5 (2010). Although my book concerns only administrative power, this is
a large part of what Vermeule calls unbound executive power. For my own view, that
administrative power is limited by law. See infra subpart I(A).
5. On the question of originalism, my book’s introduction explains:
[A]lthough some defenses of administrative law complain about original intent, this
inquiry rests on something closer to original sin. Whatever one thinks about intent—
especially if one fears it as a return to the constitutional past—it should be kept in
mind that this inquiry focuses on something very different: the danger that the
government already has returned to the preconstitutional past. Thus, rather than
appeal to any interpretative doctrine, whether the living constitution or original
intent, this book draws attention to one of the central dangers that prompted the
development of constitutions. Much will be said about the history of the
Constitution, but the argument here mainly concerns the revival of a historically
dangerous sort of power.
HAMBURGER, supra note 1, at 10.
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to be called “absolute power.”6 This sounds harsh, but unlike prior
criticisms of administrative power that have employed such terms, my book
carefully defines what it means by “absolute power.”
Extralegal, Supralegal, & Consolidated.—There have long been
different understandings of absolute power, and in England much of the
king’s power—his prerogative—was absolute in three senses. It was
extralegal in that it bound not merely through law (and the decisions of the
courts), but also through other sorts of edicts.7 It also was supralegal in that
it rose above law, as evident in expectations that the judges were to defer to
it, not merely to the law.8 Last but not least, it was consolidated in that it
combined all three powers of government in a single individual or
administrative body.9
Contemporary administrative power is similar. Like the absolute
prerogative power, administrative power binds through edicts other than
law and in this sense is extralegal, it gets the deference of the courts and in
this sense is supralegal, and it combines all three powers of government in
the executive or agencies and in this sense is consolidated.10 At least in
these ways, administrative power is absolute.
Not Unlimited.—At the same time, my book emphatically rejects the
notion that administrative power in the United States is generally unbound
by law. Whereas Vermeule has argued that the executive is (and should be)
largely unbound by law, and although he attributes a version of this position
to me, my book expressly rejects so extreme a position.11 After reciting the
three absolutist elements of administrative power, the book explains:
In contrast, a fourth version of absolute power is much less
significant for understanding administrative law—this being the
conception of absolute power as unlimited. Extra- and supralegal
power often escaped the limits of law, and absolute power therefore
could be viewed as unlimited power. Administrative law, however,
6. HAMBURGER, supra note 1, at 25.
7. See id. An entire section is devoted to defining extralegal power, and this section begins:
“Governments often bind their subjects not merely through the law and the orders of the courts,
but through other sorts of commands and orders. In this sense, governments sometimes exercise
extralegal power.” Id. at 21.
8. See id. at 25.
9. Id.
10. See generally id. at 227–76 (extralegal), 283–321 (supralegal), 323–408 (consolidated).
11. For Vermeule’s view of the executive as unbound, see POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note
4, at 4–5; and Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Goldilocks Executive, 90 TEXAS
L. REV. 973, 984–85 (2012), which discusses the overstated character of Vermeule’s claim for an
unbound executive. For his attempt to attribute a version of such a position to me, see infra
subpart II(C). For my book’s express rejection of this position, see the text immediately below
this note.
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is not entirely unlimited. Although it suffers from many problems, it
is absolute mostly in the first three ways mentioned here, and this is
serious enough.12
In short, although administrative power is absolute in some senses, and
although it is a large part of Vermeule’s unbound executive power, it is not
absolute in the fourth sense of being generally unlimited by law.

Extralegal Does Not Mean Unauthorized.—Even where administrative
power has statutory authorization, it remains extralegal. In other words,
notwithstanding Vermeule’s suggestions, “just because a power runs
outside the law, rather than through it, does not mean it lacks at least a
semblance of legal authorization.”13 Thus, “quite apart from the question of
legal authorization, there remains the underlying problem of extralegal
power—the problem of power imposed not through the law, but through
other sorts of commands.”14 And this matters because “administrative
power . . . imposes rules and adjudications in addition to those of the law,
and even where these extralegal constraints have statutory authorization,
they interfere with the extent of the liberty enjoyed under the law.”15
A Mode of Evasion.—Being extralegal in the sense that it binds
through edicts other than law, administrative power evades constitutionally
authorized paths of power. “The central evasion is the end run around acts
of Congress and the judgments of the courts by substituting executive
edicts,” thus creating “an alternative system of law, which is not quite law,
but that nonetheless can be enforced against the public.”16
That, however, is not all, for “the evasion also gets around the
Constitution’s institutions and processes.”17 When the executive makes
regulations, it can “escape the constitutional requirements for the election of
lawmakers, for bicameralism, for deliberation, for publication of legislative
journals, and for a veto,” and when the executive adjudicates disputes, it
can “sidestep most of the requirements about judicial independence, due
process, grand juries, petit juries, and judicial warrants and orders.”18 This
judicial evasion is especially troubling because “it escapes almost all of the
procedural rights guaranteed by the Constitution.”19
12. HAMBURGER, supra note 1, at 25.
13. Id. at 23.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 7–8.
16. Id. at 29. Administrative power also is an end run around treaties, but for simplicity’s
sake this is not pursued here.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. Although administrative adjudication comes with its “lesser, administrative version of
due process,” it is unclear “how a fraction of a right can substitute for the whole, or how the due
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Indeed, administrative power creates a cascade of evasions, in which
each type of administrative lawmaking functions as an evasion of others.
Thus, “administrative legislation has developed as a cascade of evasions—
initially an evasion of law, but then a series of evasions within
administrative lawmaking.”20
And this is very revealing about
administrative power. Both its structure and its trajectory can be seen as a
cascade of evasions.
Of course, these aspects of absolute power are not my book’s only
conceptual contributions. But they are enough to lay out the foundation of
the book’s argument.
B.

History: The Revival of Absolute Power

Not only conceptually but also historically, my book shows that
administrative power revives absolute power.21 Indeed, there has been
direct continuity between European absolute power and contemporary
American administrative power.
Revival of Absolutism.—Although administrative power is widely
claimed to be a modern solution to the complexity of modern society, it
more clearly is a revival of the ancient and recurring danger of absolute
power. The revival of absolute power should not be a surprise, for the
temptation to evade established avenues of power by turning to extralegal
paths can be as powerful in a republic as in a monarchy. Just as English
monarchs employed prerogative power to evade the need to rule though the
laws and courts, so too American governments have used administrative
power for such purposes.22
The revival of such mechanisms reaches even the details of judicial
deference. James I sought judicial deference to the statutory interpretations
of his prerogative bodies, and similarly the executive now seeks judicial
deference to the statutory interpretations of administrative agencies.23
Of course, there are many differences. Most significantly, what once
was the monarch’s personal prerogative power is now the state’s
bureaucratic administrative power—a shift that was beginning already by
the sixteenth century. But this shift to a more institutional version of the
power does not alter its extralegal and thus absolute character.

process of administrative power in an administrative tribunal can substitute for the due process of
law in a court. This is like a substitution of water for whisky, and the fact that both are liquid does
not hide the evasion.” Id.
20. Id. at 111.
21. Id. at 6, 25.
22. See id. at 29–30.
23. See id. at 315–17, 319–21.
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Continuity of Absolutism.—Administrative power does more than
revive absolute power; it is in fact a direct continuation of it. This initially
may seem improbable, for (as will be discussed shortly) absolutism was
defeated by constitutional law in seventeenth-century England and even
more systematically by written constitutions in eighteenth-century America.
But that was not the end of the matter. Even after it was rejected in
common law countries, it survived on the Continent, especially in Germany,
and from there it eventually circled back to common law countries.24
It was most prominently in Germany, in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, that the absolute prerogative of monarchs began to become the
administrative power of the state. This was transformative for Germany,
because absolute power in administrative form became an instrument of
imposing order or Ordnung—eventually to the point that many Germans
became accustomed to being ruled.25 Germans were the primary exponents
and theorists of administrative power, and they often self-consciously
espoused it as an anti-republican and anti-constitutional mode of
government.26
In the last half of the nineteenth century, many American progressives
were becoming discontent with the representative government established
by American constitutions, and many of them found German and especially
Prussian administrative ideas to be a satisfying alternative.27 They soon
shared their Germanic ideas in American universities, law schools,
professional associations, early think tanks, and government departments,
and the administrative power drawn from Germany soon enjoyed a growing
popularity.28 The full story is complex, but suffice it to say that, although
absolute power had earlier been defeated by constitutional law in England
and America, it was reintroduced primarily by way of Germany.
Administrative power thus revives—indeed, continues—the old danger
of absolute power. And this history matters, at the very least because it
suggests much about the nature of administrative power and why it is so
dangerous.
C.

Constitutional Law: The Rejection of Absolute Power

It is often said that because administrative power is a modern
development, the U.S. Constitution could not have anticipated it, and that it
therefore is not barred by the U.S. Constitution. This, however, is deeply

24. Id. at 441–78, 493–98.
25. See id. at 506–09; see also MARY FULBROOK, A CONCISE HISTORY OF GERMANY 71 (2d
ed. 2004) (on how German political culture was reshaped when “habits of obedience and servility
were stressed, for subjects rather than citizens”).
26. See HAMBURGER, supra note 1, at 447–50.
27. See id. at 369–74 (regarding discontent), 450–53 (regarding interest in German ideas).
28. See id. at 459–62.
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mistaken.
Development of Constitutional Law in Response to Absolutism.—My
book lays the foundation for its constitutional argument by observing that
absolute power was the primary danger that provoked the development of
constitutional law.29 Vermeule dismisses my argument as poor originalism,
saying that it focuses too much on the seventeenth century and on Germany,
and not enough on 1789.30 This, however, misses the nature of my
argument, which looks at the preeminent danger that constitutions were
designed to prevent. Put generally, constitutional law, in England and
America, cannot be understood without recognizing the underlying fear of
absolute power—the fear of extralegal, supralegal, and consolidated power.
Absolute power prompted the English in the seventeenth century to
explore ideas of constitutional law.31 Early Americans were vividly aware
of the English history and the continuing danger, and although they had to
deal with their own dangers, they systematically drafted their constitutions,
including the U.S. Constitution, to bar any absolute prerogative or other
absolute power. “As put by John Adams in 1776, Americans aimed to
establish governments in which a governor or president had ‘the whole
executive power, after divesting it of those badges of domination called
prerogatives,’ by which Adams meant, of course, the absolute
prerogatives.”32
The point is that, far from being unable to anticipate the problem,
American constitutions were designed to bar absolute power. That is, they
were designed to bar extralegal, supralegal, and consolidated power. Of
course, the past version of such power was “prerogative,” and the new sort
would be more “administrative.” One way or the other, however, the
danger of absolute power was widely familiar, and it therefore is no surprise
that American constitutions systematically rejected it.

29. See id. at 12.
30. Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1551.
31. Incidentally, the English had to turn to ideas of constitutional law because English kings
claimed that they had legal authority for their absolute power. Kings sometimes claimed common
law foundations and sometimes statutory grants for their absolute power, and either way,
opponents of royal absolute power could not rest simply on the law; instead, they needed to base
their claims on a higher sort of law. As I have shown elsewhere, ideas of constitutional law had
been familiar among some English lawyers since at least the late fifteenth century, but such ideas
flourished only when seventeenth-century English kings made extravagant assertions of absolute
power based on law. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 82–86 (2008). At that
point, the idea of an English constitution—a higher sort of English law—seemed a valuable
response and thereby became popular. See id. at 85.
32. HAMBURGER, supra note 1, at 28 (quoting Letter from John Adams to William Hooper
(Mar. 27, 1776), in 4 THE ADAMS PAPERS: THE PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 76 (Robert J. Taylor et
al. eds., 1979)).

2016]

Response

213

U.S. Constitution.—My book completes its constitutional argument by
showing that many provisions in the U.S. Constitution bar extralegal and
other absolute power. They do this primarily by requiring the government
to exercise its binding power through the law and the courts. My arguments
from specific clauses of the Constitution are too lengthy to be summarized
in detail here, but some examples can be listed:
• The first substantive word of the Constitution, the word “All” in
Article I, bars any congressional subdelegation of legislative
powers.33
• Congress cannot delegate judicial power because the
Constitution vests Congress only with legislative powers, and
Congress cannot delegate a power it does not have.34
• Article III’s delegation of judicial power to courts staffed by
judges with the duty to exercise their own independent judgment
precludes any judicial subdelegation of judicial power.35
• The Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes Congress to do
what is necessary and proper to execute the powers vested by the
Constitution in the government or in any department or officer
thereof. The Clause thereby avoids authorizing any relocation of
such powers.36
• The privilege against self-incrimination not only limits selfincrimination in the courts but also precludes it in attempts to
impose binding adjudication outside the courts.37
• The Constitution’s guarantees of jury rights, both civil and
criminal, not only make juries available in courts but also
preclude binding adjudication outside the courts.38
• The Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process of law (like
almost every other procedural right) was understood not only to
set a standard for the courts but also to preclude adjudication
outside the courts.39
And so forth. My book thus combines an account of the underlying danger
with an analysis of how particular constitutional clauses barred it.
D.

Other Arguments

Of course, my book makes other arguments, including some that are
sociological. It observes, for example, that the knowledge class has used
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 387.
Id. at 396–97.
Id. at 397–98.
Id. at 427–29.
Id. at 252–53.
Id. at 240–48.
Id. at 254–56.
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administrative power to transfer to itself much of the power that the demos
traditionally exercised through the legislature.40 It also notes that the
growth of administrative power in nineteenth- and twentieth-century
America was tied to the expansion of suffrage; in other words, when equal
suffrage gave blacks, women, and other minorities more of a voice in
electing their lawmakers, lawmaking power was removed from the
legislature.41 The book further points out that administrative power burdens
Americans with a system of governance that dates back to the age of the
horse and buggy—indeed, back to the Middle Ages.42 Most generally, it
argues that administrative power is a threat to modern society, modern
science, and their blessings.43
The full range of my book’s arguments, however, need not be explored
here. Enough has been said to suggest the gist of its conceptual, historical,
and constitutional claims.
II.

Mischaracterization

Instead of answering my book’s arguments, Vermeule’s review
persistently mischaracterizes them. The mischaracterizations concern my
constitutional, conceptual, and doctrinal arguments, and he thereby
condemns my book for arguments it does not make, and for not making
arguments it does make.
A.

Alleged Failure to Argue from the U.S. Constitution

Vermeule’s primary mischaracterization of my constitutional argument
is that I don’t really argue from the U.S. Constitution. He declares that he
cannot understand what my book means when it says that administrative
law is unlawful, and after treating my vision of unlawfulness as a great
puzzle, he then declares that “I’ll try to reconstruct Hamburger’s critique”
and suggests that I must be arguing not from the U.S. Constitution, but
merely from “deep, unwritten principles of Anglo-American constitutional
order.”44 He thereby “reconstruct[s]” my argument in a way that deprives it
of its constitutional force and then condemns my book for making such a
weak argument!
In fact, my book argues that administrative power is unconstitutional
40. See id. at 363, 369–72.
41. Id. at 502.
42. See id. at 481.
43. See id. at 484–85.
44. Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1548. When he begins speaking of his “reconstruction” of my
argument in terms of an amorphous Anglo-American constitutionalism, he says that his
reconstruction is “tentative.” Id. at 1552. Within several pages, however, he speaks more
confidently. Writing of my views on authorizing statutes, he claims that I “have to say . . . they
violate the deep principles of Anglo-American constitutionalism,” and then adds: “As we will see,
he does say that . . . .” Id. at 1555.
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because it violates the U.S. Constitution. It ordinarily would be ridiculous
to have to assert this, but Vermeule repeatedly mischaracterizes my book as
largely indifferent to the U.S. Constitution.45
How much is Vermeule evading when he suggests that my book does
not really argue from the U.S. Constitution? Well, some examples of my
book’s arguments from particular clauses of the Constitution have already
been seen in subpart I(C). They include detailed arguments from Articles I
and III, from the Necessary and Proper Clause and its focus on the powers
vested by the Constitution, from the jury guarantees, from the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and indeed, from almost all the
procedural rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. But Vermeule mentions
none of this. Instead, he dismisses my argument as one based on vague
common law principles.
Of course, my book also makes arguments that are not based
specifically on the U.S. Constitution. But even many of these other
arguments, including many of the historical arguments, contribute to the
book’s conclusion that the U.S. Constitution bars administrative power.46
Vermeule’s claim is thus rather odd. Rather than respond to my
repeated arguments from the U.S. Constitution, he simply denies that I
make such arguments.47 This “reconstruction” is simply false. No?
B.

Alleged Definition of Extralegal as Unauthorized

My book’s central conceptual point is that administrative power is
“extralegal.” Vermeule recognizes that this is my “basic charge,” but he

45. Vermeule, having read my book, must know that it argues from the U.S. Constitution, and
he therefore avoids directly saying that it does not rest on the U.S. Constitution. Instead, he
evades this reality by saying things like: “The main point, for [Hamburger], isn’t that
administrative law is inconsistent with this or that constitutional clause or even the best overall
interpretation of the Constitution.” Id. at 1551 (emphasis added). Similarly, he says that my
“deepest commitment is to this common law version of Anglo-American constitutionalism,” and
that it is “of secondary interest” to me “whether the written constitutional rules of the United
States, as of 1789, correspond to that substantive vision.” Id. at 1552 (emphasis added). He
thereby represents my arguments on the basis of what he attributes to my mental state rather than
on the basis of what my book actually says.
46. In support of his mischaracterization, Vermeule quotes my book’s explanation that it aims
to go beyond the scholarship that studies administrative power by focusing “on the flat question of
unconstitutionality”—“as if it were merely a flat legal question about compliance with the
Constitution.” Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1551–52 (quoting HAMBURGER, supra note 1, at 5, 15).
My book’s point, however, is not that administrative unlawfulness should be measured by
something other than the U.S. Constitution, but rather that one cannot understand the
Constitution’s meaning without first considering the underlying depth of historical experience,
including the dangers the Constitution was meant to prevent. As put by my book, it is a mistake to
“reduce[] administrative law to an issue of law divorced from the underlying historical experience
and thus separated from empirical evidence about the dangers.” HAMBURGER, supra note 1, at 15.
And Vermeule knows this is my meaning, for he quotes this passage. Vermeule, supra note 1, at
1551–52.
47. See Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1553.
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misstates it in a way that attributes to me a position that I expressly and
repeatedly reject.48
He claims that when speaking of administrative power as “extralegal,”
I mean it is without statutory authorization—that it “rests on ‘prerogative’”
rather than an act of Congress.49 He then protests that this “would become a
far more difficult claim to defend to the extent that administrative law
enjoys valid statutory authorization”—as if I were even unaware of the
existence of statutory authorization.50 Both suggestions are obviously false.
Vermeule, however, persists. On the basis of these false claims—that
when administrative power has statutory authorization it is “not extralegal”
and that I am unaware that “administrative law enjoys valid statutory
authorization”—Vermeule adds that “delegation theory is critical for
Hamburger, because, . . . it scrambles his categories.”51 Actually Vermeule
scrambles my categories.
My book explains that administrative power is extralegal in the sense
that it binds not merely through statutes or court decisions, but through
other edicts, and that such edicts therefore remain extralegal even when
they have statutory authorization.52 This had been true of prerogative
power, and it nowadays is true of administrative power. As put by my
book’s section defining extralegal power:
Obviously, just because a power runs outside the law, rather than
through it, does not mean it lacks at least a semblance of legal
authorization. It will be seen that Henry VIII secured candid
statutory authorization for some of his extralegal power, that the
prerogative courts made strained claims of statutory authorization,
and that early English kings often left it ambiguous whether they
were acting under or above the law. Similarly, today, administrative
law is said to have legal authorization—sometimes in clear statutory
language, sometimes in strained interpretations of statutes, and
sometimes in sheer ambiguity.
But quite apart from the question of legal authorization, there
remains the underlying problem of extralegal power—the problem of
power imposed not through the law, but through other sorts of
commands. On this basis, when this book speaks of administrative
law as a power outside the law—or as an extralegal, irregular, or
extraordinary power—it is observing that administrative law purports
to bind subjects not through the law, but through other sorts of

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 1555.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1556–57.
See supra subpart I(A).
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directives.53
In short, extralegal power includes any attempt to issue binding edicts other
than statutes and court decisions, regardless of statutory authorization.
Why then does Vermeule misstate my central argument about
extralegal power as if it was referring to unauthorized power and as if I do
not understand the existence of statutory authorization? Both suggestions
are patently false. No?

C.

Alleged Doctrinal Errors

Many of Vermeule’s mischaracterizations of my book come in the
form of strong accusations of doctrinal error. Vermeule declares that my
book makes “crippling mistakes about the administrative law of the United
States.”54
Indeed, he repeats this like a drumbeat.
My book
“misunderstands what that body of law actually holds”; it is “light on
knowledge of administrative law”; its arguments are “premised on simple,
material, and fatal understandings of what is being criticized”; and so
forth.55
But he does not substantiate it. For starters, notice that he never points
to any positive error in any sentence of mine on contemporary
administrative doctrine. Instead, my alleged errors turn out to be sins of
omission—things such as that I do not discuss a doctrine that is of minimal
relevance to my argument, or more generally that I do not discuss doctrine
in the respectfully attentive and detailed manner one would expect in a
Nutshell. This, according to Vermeule, is to misunderstand doctrine.
To complain that my book should have discussed matters that it did
not, and that it should have explored some in greater detail, is not
unreasonable. To say that the book is therefore in error about doctrine is
just silly. It is more mischaracterization.
Here are just a few examples:
Alleged Failure to Recognize the Supreme Court’s Theory of
Nondelegation.—Vermeule claims that my book does not recognize that
“administrative law denies that there is any delegation of legislative power
at all so long as the legislature has supplied an ‘intelligible principle’ to
guide the exercise of delegated discretion. Where there is such a principle,
the delegatee is exercising executive power, not legislative power.”56 But
that is what my book discusses at the head of its chapter on subdelegation.
Here are my words: “the Court requires Congress to offer agencies at least

53.
54.
55.
56.

HAMBURGER, supra note 1, at 23.
Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1547.
Id. at 1547–48, 1554.
Id. at 1558.
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an ‘intelligible principle’”—the assumption being that “where Congress
provides such guidance, the agencies are merely filling in details and thus
are not making, but merely executing the law. On this fiction, the Court can
pretend that Congress is not delegating legislative power.”57
There is little difference between Vermeule’s presentation of the
Court’s nondelegation theory and mine, except that I view it skeptically. 58
His claim that my book doesn’t recognize the Court’s theory is thus clearly
false. No?
Alleged Failure to Recognize the Theory that the Executive Merely
Fills in Details.—In mischaracterizing my treatment of nondelegation,
Vermeule claims that I do not address the theory that “it is an indispensably
executive task to ‘fill in the details’ of statutes with binding regulations”
and further that I do not address the associated historical claim that this
theory “has been adopted in American constitutional law from the
beginning, as evidenced by unbroken legislative and executive practice.”59
As Vermeule puts it, “Hamburger may disagree with that theory or with the
historical claim, but shouldn’t he address them squarely?”60 In fact, my
book addresses both points in detail.
As for the theory, my book observes that it is a rank fiction.61 And my
book has good company for dismissing the theory as fictional, for James
Landis himself explained: “[I]t is obvious that the resort to the
administrative process is not, as some suppose, simply an extension of
executive power,” and those who “have sought to liken this development to
a pervasive use of executive power” are “[c]onfused.”62
On the historical claim, much of Chapter Six is devoted to showing
that early federal statutes and executive practice reveal little support for any
power in the executive to fill in binding details—a point to which this
57. HAMBURGER, supra note 1, at 378.
58. Of course, after recognizing the “official theory” of nondelegation, my book then argues
against the delegation of legislative power, for such delegation is a central reality of the
administrative state. Vermeule, however, takes my opposition to the reality of delegation as an
opportunity to suggest that the book does not recognize the “official theory” of nondelegation.
See Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1557. He even goes so far as to say: “Unfortunately there is no
one, or almost no one, on the other side of [his] argument [that delegation is unconstitutional].
Administrative law is in near-complete agreement with Hamburger on this point.” Id. The reality
of administrative delegation, however, is widely recognized, and my book’s focus on this reality
does not excuse Vermeule’s suggestion that the book does not recognize the official theory of
nondelegation.
59. Id. at 1561–62, 1562 (emphasis omitted).
60. Id. at 1562.
61. See HAMBURGER, supra note 1, at 378.
62. JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 15 (1966). For a discussion of
Landis’ point, see JOSEPH POSTELL, “THE PEOPLE SURRENDER NOTHING”: THE SOCIAL
COMPACT FOUNDATION OF THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE (forthcoming) (manuscript at 16)
(on file with author).
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Response will return in subpart V(B).63 The theory that the executive does
not legislate in its administrative edicts, but merely specifies the law, is
taken so seriously by my book that it traces the early history of this idea—
not back to the early Republic, as Vermeule imagines, but to Prussia. The
notion of mere executive administration, as opposed to legislation or
politics, was a German and especially Prussian doctrine designed to defeat
representative and constitutional government.64 Such is the real origin of
the theory that Vermeule thinks needs to be take seriously as a product of
“American constitutional law from the beginning, as evidenced by
unbroken legislative and executive practice.”65
Vermeule thus is mistaken in suggesting that my book does not
squarely address the theory and the underlying historical claim. On both
the theory and the history, these criticisms are simply false. No?
Alleged Failure to Recognize the Authorization for the Combination of
Functions.—Echoing his earlier mischaracterization of my notion of
extralegal power, Vermeule suggests that in discussing the separation of
powers, I simply don’t understand that the three parts of government have
authorized the combination of their functions in agencies.66
This claim that my book does not recognize the subconstitutional
authorization for the combination of functions is of course ludicrous—
especially as my book repeatedly discusses the authorization for the
combination of powers. Just for example, Chapter Seven begins by
explaining that extralegal legislation (usually a combination of legislative
and executive powers) “currently enjoys its authority under—or at least in
the context of—the 1946 Administrative Procedure Act.”67 Indeed, when
complaining about “consolidated power,” my book devotes a whole chapter
to arguing against the statutory and judicial authorization for such power.68
Vermeule’s suggestion that I don’t understand the source of the combined
agency functions is thus just inane and false. No?
Alleged Failure to Recognize the Statutory Limits on the Combination

63. See HAMBURGER, supra note 1, at 83–110.
64. For the German distinction between administration and, on the other hand, politics and
lawmaking, see id. at 464 n.l. For its place in the more fundamental German distinction
administrative and constitutional matters, see id. at 463–65.
65. Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1562.
66. See id. at 1564 (“Where on earth does Hamburger think combined agency functions come
from? The combination of functions in agencies results from the operation of the system of
separated legislative, executive, and judicial powers.”).
67. HAMBURGER, supra note 1, at 111.
68. See id. at 377–402 (discussing subdelegation). For other discussion of the APA or judicial
acquiescence in what it authorizes, see id. at 112 n.a, 230, 233, 233 n.d, 242, 250, 310–12, 314,
317–18, 351, 361, 482.
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of Functions.—Expanding on this mischaracterization, Vermeule says that,
“from reading this book, one would never guess that administrative law
spends as much time limiting the combination of functions as enabling it.”69
In particular, he suggests that my book does not discuss how the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) “requires strict separation of
adjudicative functions from prosecutorial and investigative ones, in formal
on-the-record adjudication before an administrative law judge, but not in
rule making, and not at the top level of the agency.”70
My book, however, does discuss how the APA “distinguishes between
the executive and judicial functions of administrators,” and how it “bars a
decisionmaker from deciding a case if he has ‘engaged in the performance
of investigative or prosecuting functions’ in it.”71
The difference is that whereas he takes satisfaction that the glass is
half-full, my book points out that the glass is half-empty and that this is a
dangerous threat to due process. For example, Vermeule emphasizes that
the APA bars “ex parte contacts in formal adjudication” and that “those
rules do apply at the top level of the agency.”72 In contrast, my book notes
that the heads of agencies “usually are political appointees, who do not
enjoy protection in tenure or salary, who can be fully engaged in
investigating and prosecuting the cases they decide, and who usually can
receive all sorts of internal off-the-record suggestions and advice on a
case.”73 Similarly, although we both discuss some of the protections in
formal adjudications, my book draws attention to the dangers in informal
administrative adjudications, which “are utterly summary,” being “without
even the pretense of dispassionate adjudicators and proceedings.”74 They
are “not even within the Administrative Procedure Act’s efforts to separate
functions, to allow counsel, to allow confrontation of witnesses, to require a
record of hearings, or to require a preponderance of the evidence.”75
Nonetheless, Vermeule suggests that my book does not recognize the
limits on the combination of functions. That is false. No?
Summary.—So numerous are the mischaracterizations that (to spare the
reader) some are abbreviated in the note below and others are simply left
unmentioned.76 Enough have been detailed to show how Vermeule deflects

69. Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1564–65.
70. Id.
71. HAMBURGER, supra note 1, at 230, 235.
72. Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1565.
73. HAMBURGER, supra note 1, at 236.
74. Id. at 256.
75. Id.
76. Although a full enumeration of Vermeule’s mischaracterizations would take up too much
space, here are a few others:
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my book’s critique by mischaracterizing its constitutional, conceptual, and
doctrinal arguments.
Looking over Vermeule’s “reconstruction” of my arguments, one can
see that it comes in three versions. Most candidly, there is what he bluntly
calls his “reconstruction,” in which he claims I don’t argue from the U.S.
Constitution. More subtle is his speculation about what I “must be” saying
or what I “seem to say,” thereby attributing to me positions that are easy to
denigrate.77 Finally, there is the hidden reconstruction, in which he
Alleged Belief that Executive Power Is Merely the Power to Execute the Laws.—
According to Vermeule, I think that the “only power” of the executive is the power
“to ‘execute’ the laws, understood very narrowly—basically the power to bring
prosecutions and other court proceedings to ask judges to enforce statutes.”
Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1552. In fact, my book rejects this position and argues,
instead, that executive power consists of the authority to exercise all of the
government’s lawful force. See HAMBURGER, supra note 1, at 328 n.a, 332.
Alleged Ignorance of the Delegation Justification for Chevron Deference.—My book
does not bother to mention the delegation justification for Chevron, and on this basis
Vermeule suggests that my book “doesn’t know” about this justification. See
Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1554. What he fails to mention is that my book’s
argument against Chevron is not statutory, but constitutional, and that the statutory
delegation justification is therefore irrelevant. See HAMBURGER, supra note 1, at
315–16.
Alleged Special Test for Taxation.—According to Vermeule, I think administrative
taxation should be subject to a different constitutional test than other administrative
lawmaking. See Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1563. In fact, my book nowhere says
this. On the contrary, although my book pays attention to the ways in which
determinations, penalties, taxes, nuisance decisions, and licensing can become
specialized types of administrative lawmaking, it argues that all binding extralegal
lawmaking is equally unlawful, without distinction. HAMBURGER, supra note 1, at
115–20. “Whatever the form, it all returns to extralegal legislation.” Id. at 120.
Alleged Failure to Present Contemporary Evidence of Institutional Bias Among
ALJs.—Vermeule claims that my argument about the institutional bias of
administrative adjudicators is based on utterly obsolete sources—that it rests
“principally on the basis of a discussion of Montesquieu (!)” and other sources that
are so old as to be “irrelevant to the incentives and possible biases of the modern
administrative law judge.” Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1565 n.93. Actually, my book
has two sections on the bias of administrative adjudicators—one section focusing on
the contemporary mechanics of the bias, the other taking a more philosophical
approach. See HAMBURGER, supra note 1, at 231–37, 337–39. Vermeule is silent
about my section on the contemporary nuts and bolts and its contemporary sources.
Dead silent. Instead, he mentions only my more philosophic section, even rooting
around in its philosophical and historical endnotes, to claim, falsely, that my
treatment of bias does not argue from contemporary realties. Id.
77. For example, Vermeule writes of me that “he must be using the word law in two different
senses to say that a body of ‘law’ is ‘unlawful.’” Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1551. Well, not
really, if one assumes that there are different levels of law and that regulations or statutes can be
unlawful under the Constitution. In another instance, he writes: “Hamburger . . . seems to say that
officials exercise ‘legislative’ power whenever, and just so long as, they issue ‘binding’
commands.” Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1560. Actually, the book repeatedly distinguishes
between binding lawmaking and binding adjudication; so it clearly does not say what Vermeule
attributes to it.
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misstates my arguments without even a hint of what he is doing. With or
without candor, all three modes of reconstruction mischaracterize my
book’s arguments in ways that conveniently render them feeble or foolish.
Ultimately, the problem is not simply Vermeule’s mischaracterization
of my book, but his failure to wrestle with the realities of administrative
power. Recall these examples:
• In mischaracterizing the concept of extralegal power and in
denying that my book argues from the U.S. Constitution, he fails
to confront the reality of extralegal power and its evasion of the
constitutionally authorized paths of power.78
• In protesting that the official theory is nondelegation—a theory
he candidly does not believe and that in fact my book discusses—
he fails to deal with the reality of delegation.79
• In emphasizing the subconstitutional authorization for the
combination of functions and in falsely claiming that I don’t
understand this authorization, he fails to deal with the reality of
consolidated power and how it violates the Constitution.80
The mischaracterization thus allows Vermeule to avoid confronting the
realities of administrative power and the powerful arguments against it.
III. Not a Nutshell
Vermeule once stood astride the law and declared the executive
unbound.81 Now he hunkers down under doctrine to show that the
executive really is bound. He adds that, because I do not crouch with him
in the doctrinal trenches, I am out of bounds. But my book is not a
Nutshell.
A.

Inconsistency

Vermeule previously echoed the little boy who shouted, “The Emperor
has no clothes!” The difference was that, unlike the little boy, Vermeule
hailed the Emperor’s sartorial freedom and asked others to join in
celebrating his naked power. Since then, however, my book has argued that
it is dangerously unconstitutional for binding power to be exercised through
edicts other than law, and Vermeule has become worried that this argument
may have the “dangerous” effect of “delegitim[izing] the administrative
state” by “tear[ing] out its intellectual struts.”82 Vermeule therefore has
changed his tune. Now, he joins the crowd who protest that the Emperor is
78. See supra subpart II(B).
79. See supra subpart II(C); see also Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1560 (“[T]he official theory
of delegation in American administrative law is not a view that I agree with.”).
80. See supra subpart II(C).
81. See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 4, at 4–5.
82. Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1554.
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well clothed in law, and he sputters that it is downright ignorant, even
nearly seditious, to suggest otherwise.83
In defense of administrative power, Vermeule thus moves from one
mistaken extreme to another—from the error of thinking the executive
unbound by law to the error of suggesting that it is largely bound by law
and entirely lawful. And this leads him to shift gears on doctrine. Having
ignored much doctrine to declare the executive “unbound,” he now declares
it shocking, just shocking, that a book portraying administrative power as
legally limited does not recite the limits in tedious detail.84
Other scholars have noted Vermeule’s volte face. Michael Ramsay
writes: “But wait . . . I thought that the modern reality is (or ought to be)
that the executive (and so at least the administrative state that’s controlled
by the executive) is ‘unbound’ by law (though checked by politics).”85
Gabriel Sanchez observes that, although consistency is not necessarily a
virtue, candor is: “[I]f one does change their views or alters a position
champed earlier in one’s career, then just say so. It demonstrates far more
intellectual and personal maturity than playing the caginess card.”86
Vermeule protests that he is not really inconsistent, and he has a
point.87 Rather than inconsistent, perhaps he merely is persistent (even to
the point of being willing to weave back and forth) in defense of an
otherwise indefensible power.
For purposes of evaluating my book, however, it makes no difference
whether Vermeule has been inconsistent. His inconsistency does not matter
here, except as another reminder of the contortions that apparently are
necessary to defend administrative power.
B.

Not a Nutshell

What matters more centrally here is that, in the course of changing
positions, Vermeule suggests that my book is flawed because it does not
summarize introductory doctrine and cases. He insists that a detailed

83. For the nearly seditious, see infra subpart V(B).
84. For my book’s understanding of administrative power as limited by law, see supra subpart
I(A). For Vermeule’s inattention to the doctrinal limits on executive power, see Prakash &
Ramsey, supra note 11, at 984–85.
85. Michael Ramsey, Adrian Vermeule Reviews Philip Hamburger’s, “Is Administrative Law
Unlawful?”, ORIGINALISM BLOG (Sept. 1, 2014, 6:14 AM),
http://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2014/09/adrian-vermeule-reviews-philiphamburgers-is-administrative-law-unlawfulmichael-ramsey.html [http://perma.cc/8YSE-NJKN].
86. Gabriel Sanchez, Consistent Legal Scholarship?, OPUS PUBLICUM (Sept. 2, 2014),
http://opuspublicum.com/2014/09/02/consistent-legal-scholarship/ [http://perma.cc/YGW8BU8B].
87. Eric Posner, Adrian Vermeule on Philip Hamburger’s “Is Administrative Law
Unlawful?”, ERIC POSNER: LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP BLOG (Sept. 2, 2014),
http://ericposner.com/adrian-vermeule-on-philip-hamburgers-is-administrative-law-unlawful/
[http://perma.cc/QK9P-GADP].
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parsing of doctrine or internal legal argument is an essential foundation for
a book on administrative power—or at least for my book.88 And this is
puzzling. It is as if Vermeule thinks that an intellectually serious account of
administrative power needs to read like a Nutshell, replete with tedious
summaries of the APA, the leading cases, and their doctrines. As he puts it,
my book has “not enough about . . . the statutes, cases, and arguments that
rank beginners in the subject are expected to learn and know.” 89 He even
protests that there are not enough case citations!90
But my book is not a Nutshell. Nor is it even a more serious treatise
on the statutory and judicial foundations of administrative power. Instead,
it is a reconceptualization of administrative power, based on an inquiry into
the recurring dangers that informed the Constitution’s framing and
adoption. This is a serious endeavor, and it is strangely anti-intellectual to
suggest that a book cannot question administrative law without delving in
Nutshell-like detail into its internal doctrinal justifications.
This is not to say doctrine should be ignored, but why must a book that
takes a broadly critical stance regurgitate familiar doctrine as if it were an
introductory hornbook? Although my scholarship alludes to doctrine to the
extent necessary, it assumes that educated readers do not need to be
instructed on further details. Vermeule’s demand for more doctrine is thus
strangely misplaced.
C.

The Inadequacy of Internal Legal Doctrines For Understanding
Administrative Power

Vermeule’s complaint that my book does not dwell on the “official
theory” of administrative power is particularly off-target because one can
understand this power only by stepping outside such theory.91 The realities
of administrative power go far beyond what the APA establishes and the
courts recognize in their doctrines, and because the courts have failed to
understand the constitutional questions, even these cannot be understood in
the terms offered by the courts. For these reasons alone, the “internal legal
argument” for administrative power is not apt to be very illuminating.
The most basic mistake made by Vermeule is to view “official
theory”—primarily the APA and judicial doctrines—as revealing about the
underlying structure of administrative power. Much of the APA and many
judicial doctrines serve to justify administrative power, and in casting the
realities of this power in legitimizing terms, the APA and the doctrines may

88. Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1559–60.
89. Id. at 1547. Similarly, after reciting some of the cases he teaches, he complains that “none
of these are to be found in the index to the book”—as if a book is to be measured by its potential
to complement his administrative law class. Id. at 1566.
90. Id. at 1547, 1557–58, 1565–66.
91. Id. at 1556–60.
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have some value as apologetics, but not so much as a window into reality.
Far from disclosing the actual landscape of administrative power, the
“official theory” often obscures it. As put by Daniel Farber and Anne
O’Connell, there is a “gap between theory and practice,” which leads to an
“increasingly fictional yet deeply engrained account of administrative
law.”92
Hence, the necessity of my book, which argues that the key to
understanding administrative power is to recognize it, both historically and
conceptually, as extralegal power. Once this is understood, the details,
structure, and even trajectory of administrative power make sense in ways
they did not beforehand.
For example, when administrative power is understood as extralegal
power, one can see how administrative power has largely evaded the
Constitution’s paths for lawmaking and adjudication and even its
guarantees of rights. One also can see how it has largely evaded relatively
formal administrative paths in pursuit of others that are less onerous. Thus,
both the structure and the trajectory of administrative power (as already
noted in subpart I(A)) can be understood as a cascade of evasions. One
even can see how administrative doctrine and scholarship, including that by
Vermeule, has largely repackaged the old absolutist arguments inherited via
Germany—these being the foundation for many of the contemporary
justifications of administrative power.
Vermeule must understand the value of not mistaking “internal legal
arguments” for reality, for his scholarship regularly offers insight by taking
a stance from outside doctrine, with only a cursory exploration of the
doctrine’s internal logic.93 Why then does he expect my book to approach
administrative power in the manner of a Nutshell?
IV. Historical Errors
Although Vermeule does not generally respond to my history of
administrative power, he takes some little potshots, and even in these he
misses his mark. The difficulty is not simply that he confuses James I with
James II; that is telling, but merely trivial.94 More serious is his misreading
92. Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative Law, 92
TEXAS L. REV. 1137, 1180, 1189 (2014). They also write: “[S]omeone whose knowledge of
administration was based only on statutes and judicial rulings would be gravely misled about the
real dynamics of modern governance.” Id. at 1141.
93. Indeed, his scholarship sometimes gives strength to its external claim by misstating
internal doctrine. My book shows that Vermeule’s critique of the maxim against being judge in
one’s own case is based on an overstatement of the maxim. HAMBURGER, supra note 1, at 588
n.31. Moreover, as noted by Saikrishna Prakash and Michael Ramsay, The Executive Unbound
bases its thesis on an overstatement of the executive’s freedom from legal constraints. See
Prakash & Ramsay, supra note 11, at 984–85.
94. Vermeule usually recognizes the difference between the two James, but he clearly
confuses the two at one place and perhaps another. See Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1552–53,
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of evidence.
A.

Shipmoney and Chevron

Vermeule draws upon two snippets of English evidence to question my
account of English constitutional history and to offer historical legitimacy
for Chevron deference. Leave aside that two snippets of this sort cannot
overturn a vast weight of evidence, he does not even get his little bits of
history straight. In fact, he takes evidence out of context and thereby gets
the history backward.
Against my account of the constitutional rejection of prerogative or
extralegal power, and to suggest that “the story is far more nuanced than
Hamburger lets on,” he briefly alludes to the advisory opinion in the Ship
Money95 case: “When in 1637, nine of twelve judges allowed Charles I to
levy ‘ship-money’ taxes in peacetime and without statutory authorization,
the game [against the prerogative] was essentially over.”96 But this takes
the opinion entirely out of context. Far from ending “the game,” the case
spurred the nation toward a rejection of prerogative adjudication in 1641
and civil war in 1642.97 Along the way, six of the judges were impeached
for their shipmoney opinions.98 The case thus does not undercut, but
supports my book’s account of how the English rejected absolute power.99
Not content with this error, Vermeule quotes Edward Coke to suggest
that he recognized something like Chevron deference: “Distilled to its
essence, ‘the reality of the common law constitution—and the reason for its
failure—was that, as Coke himself explained it in the House of Commons
in 1628, “in a doubtful thing, interpretation goes always for the king.”‘
Chevron avant la lettre.”100 Actually, the very opposite.
Vermeule is quoting a secondary source by Adam Tomkins, who is
quoting another secondary source by Margaret Judson, who in turn is
quoting Edward Coke. The quotation thus is two steps removed from its
1555.
95. 3 Howell’s State Trials 825 (1637).
96. Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1553 (footnote omitted).
97. See HAMBURGER, supra note 1, at 61, 177; HAMBURGER, supra note 31, at 206–08.
98. Articles of Accusation, exhibited by the Commons House of Parliament now assembled,
against Sr. John Bramston Knight, Sr. Robert Berkley Knight, justices of his Majesties bench; Sr.
Francis Crawley Knight, one of the justices of the common-pleas; and Sr. Humphrey Davenport
Knight, Sr. Richard Weston Knight, and Sr. Thomas Trevor Knight, barons of his Majesties
exchequer (1641).
99. Incidentally, Vermeule summarizes the Shipmoney case as involving a levy of taxes
“without statutory authorization.” Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1553. Actually, shipmoney was a
payment based in custom. Therefore, even though it was without statutory authorization, this is
not to say it was without authority in law, and this was a large part of what was in dispute.
100. Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1553 (quoting ADAM TOMKINS, OUR REPUBLICAN
CONSTITUTION 87 (2005) (quoting MARGARET JUDSON, THE CRISIS OF THE CONSTITUTION: AN
ESSAY IN CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT IN ENGLAND, 1603–1645, at 264 (1949)
(quoting Edward Coke, Speech in the House of Commons (July 6, 1628)))).
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context. In saying “Chevron avant la lettre,” Vermeule leaves the
impression that Coke was stating a rule of interpretation. Coke, however,
was not stating the law. Instead, as Tomkins recognizes (and as Vermeule
therefore might have noticed), Coke was merely acknowledging the
“reality” that judges often gave way to pressures from the Crown. 101 Coke
elsewhere resolutely insisted that the office of the judges precluded any
deference to prerogative interpretation.102 Vermeule thus misinterprets
what Coke was saying about interpretation—indeed, flips it on its head.
B.

Early Federal Regulations

In challenging my detailed argument that administrative regulations
cannot constitutionally bind Americans, Vermeule echoes the claim, which
has appeared elsewhere in his scholarship, that early federal statutes
authorized binding regulations—the implication being that such regulations
have “Founding era credentials.”103
As shown in detail by my book, however, Vermeule is utterly mistaken
in asserting that early federal statutes authorized binding regulations.104
Except in a very narrow range of cases, which have been thoroughly
misread by Vermeule and other scholars, the statutes that are alleged to
have authorized such regulations did not do so, and early federal
departments (even under men such as Alexander Hamilton) avoided issuing
any such regulations.105
Of course, Vermeule might deny the relevance of the early history,
whether English or American, and then might leave the history alone. That
is not, however, what he does. He wants the “credentials” of history for
administrative power and thereby ends up making gross historical errors.106
V.

Attack

Topping off his mischaracterization, his demand for a Nutshell, and his
historical errors, Vermeule turns to personal attacks.
He thereby
misrepresents not only my book but also me.
A.

Ad Hominems

On the basis of his mischaracterizations, Vermeule moves beyond
condemning my arguments to condemning my competence—as if personal

101. TOMKINS, supra note 100, at 87.
102. See HAMBURGER, supra note 31, at 223–24 (recounting Coke’s statements);
HAMBURGER, supra note 1, at 54.
103. Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1560 (citing Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1732–40 (2002)).
104. HAMBURGER, supra note 1, at 83, 85–89.
105. Id.
106. See Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1560.
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accusations were a substitute for argument. He writes repeatedly of my
“misunderstanding” of administrative law, that I have “a desperately shaky
understanding of administrative law,” and that “Hamburger seems to think
he can discuss American administrative law without reading the cases.”107
He adds that I am “like a child wrecking a sculpture by Jeff Koons”; that
my book is “irresponsible”; that it is “a portent of the dimming of the legal
mind.”108
This sort of personal invective is reminiscent of the old Saturday Night
Live exchange in which Dan Akroyd regularly begins his response to Jane
Curtin: “Jane, you ignorant slut!”109
Nonetheless Vermeule digs in. In response to Ramsay’s complaint
that Vermeule is inconsistent in his critique of my book, Vermeule not only
defends inconsistency, but adds: Ramsey just “hasn’t grasped the sheer
pedantic arrogance of my position . . . which is that only those of us who
understand the basic doctrines and principles of administrative law are
entitled to debunk them.”110
Res ipsa loquitur.
B.

Accusations of Extremism

Vermeule adds to his ad hominem attacks by attempting to associate
me with extremism, even of a dangerous sort. According to Vermeule, my
book is apt to “delegitimate the administrative state,” and it thereby plays “a
dangerous game” and “might be pernicious.”111 He adds: “It’s irresponsible
to go about making or necessarily implying . . . lurid comparisons [to the
Star Chamber], which tend to feed the ‘tyrannophobia’ that bubbles
unhealthily around the margins of popular culture and that surfaces in
disturbing forms on extremist blogs in the darker corners of the Internet.”112
It is nearly comic to be accused of extremism by an exponent of
Schmittianism. But it is not really funny. What is Vermeule trying to
suggest?
C.

Policing Dissent.

One effect of Vermeule’s attacks is to demarcate outlying opinion—to
signal what is mainstream opinion and what is not, what should be taken
107. Id. at 1548, 1552, 1557, 1563.
108. Id. at 1566–67. Lest the Koons ad hominem not be clear enough, he adds: “Some admire
Koons’s work, some detest it, but the child isn’t in a position to understand why it might be
detestable, and the act is purely destructive with no illuminating import.” Id. at 1567.
109. Weekend Update: Jane, You Ignorant Slut, SATURDAY NIGHT LIVE,
http://www.nbc.com/saturday-night-live/video/point-counterpoint-lee-marvin-and-michelletriola/2846665 [https://perma.cc/7GVB-F7N8].
110. Posner, supra note 87.
111. Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1554.
112. Id. at 1566.
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seriously and what should be dismissed.113 And Vermeule is not alone, for
there have been a series of recent attempts to draw the boundaries of
acceptable opinion on administrative power by labeling dissent as
“strange,” “eccentric,” and not “serious.”114
Lawrence Tribe, for example, encountered this treatment when he
challenged the constitutionality of the EPA’s proposed “Clean Power Plan.”
In response, Jody Freeman and Richard Lazarus declared that his arguments
were “ridiculous,” “wholly without merit,” “preposterously extreme,” and
“radical,” and that “[w]ere Professor Tribe’s name not attached to them, no
one would take them seriously.”115 This led one commentator to observe
that the advocates of administrative power “use shaming to enforce the
official groupthink in the groves of legal academia.”116
Vermeule needs to keep in mind some basics of academic inquiry.
Mischaracterization does not advance the truth. Dissent is not error. Insult
and name-calling are not substitutes for argument. Ad hominem arguments
are unpersuasive and ugly. Unsupported accusations of nearly seditious
extremism are especially ugly. And all of this, especially when used to
police dissent, is profoundly anti-intellectual.
VI. Conclusion
After espousing administrative power as a sort of unbound executive
power, Vermeule now attacks my critique of administrative power in an
unbound manner. It therefore is difficult to avoid wondering whether there
is a connection. On behalf of an indefensible power, is it necessary to adopt
an indefensible mode of argument?
In a book as long as mine, there are bound to be some errors. But
whatever my book’s errors, Vermeule’s review does not identify them. In
fact, nowhere does he point to any statement of administrative power or
doctrine that it gets wrong. Instead, he persistently mischaracterizes my
113. In a subsequent article, incidentally, he distinguishes my scholarship from “normal
science,” pulls out the old canard of “the constitution in exile movement,” and links my arguments
to the Tea Party. See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 3, at 1–2, 6–7.
114. Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1562 (discussing the “strangeness” of my argument); Jody
Freeman & Richard Lazarus, Freeman and Lazarus: A Rebuttal to Tribe’s Reply, HARV. L.
TODAY (Mar. 21, 2015), http://today.law.harvard.edu/a_rebuttal_to_tribe_reply/
[http://perma.cc/9SUK-V8C8] (regarding the supposedly un-”serious” character of Lawrence
Tribe’s critique of administrative power); Cass R. Sunstein, Clarence Thomas, the Eccentric,
BLOOMBERG VIEW (Mar. 16, 2015, 9:00 AM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-0316/clarence-thomas-the-eccentric [http://perma.cc/CGF2-FFL9] (regarding the allegedly
“eccentric” views of Justice Clarence Thomas, including his views on administrative power).
115. Jody Freeman & Richard Lazarus, Freeman and Lazarus: Is the President’s Climate
Plan Unconstitutional?, HARV. L. TODAY (Mar. 18, 2015), http://today.law.harvard.edu/is-thepresidents-climate-plan-unconstitutional/ [http://perma.cc/99SC-CQ2D].
116. Francis Menton, Can the Administrative State Ever Be Reined In?, MANHATTAN
CONTRARIAN (Mar. 25, 2015), http://manhattancontrarian.com/blog/2015/3/25/can-theadministrative-state-ever-be-reined-in [http://perma.cc/4BE2-FFWX].
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arguments—denying that I make arguments from the U.S. Constitution,
reducing my central conceptual argument to something I expressly reject,
and falsely attributing doctrinal errors to me. In addition, he derides my
book as if it aimed to be a Nutshell, he insists on clearly erroneous history,
and he indulges in personal attacks.
Far from misunderstanding administrative power, my book puts it in a
historical and constitutional context that has been missing in administrative
law scholarship for more than a century. The book explains that
administrative power is a continuation of absolute power—a dangerous sort
of power that the English struggled against for centuries, that the U.S.
Constitution systematically barred, that Continental nations nonetheless
preserved, that the Germans developed as an antidote to constitutional and
representative government, and that late nineteenth-century “reformers”
brought back into common law lands.
Vermeule, however, makes no response to my actual arguments,
whether historical, conceptual, or constitutional. As noted by one observer,
“Vermeule does not attempt to rebut Hamburger’s historical narrative.”117
Vermeule, moreover, mischaracterizes my central conceptual point and
therefore does not respond to that either. And because Vermeule denies
that I argue from the U.S. Constitution, nor does he attempt to rebut my
constitutional arguments. The review thus scarcely responds at all.
What is needed is a serious and honest debate—one that confronts the
realities of administrative power and the realities of the objections to it. In
the meantime, Vermeule’s review distracts attention from the realities.
Indeed, Vermeule uses an unbound style of argument to defend what he
celebrates as unbound power. Administrative power must be unlawful if
this is its best defense against my book.

117. William Funk, Is Administrative Law Unlawful? No!, JOTWELL: ADMIN. L. (June 8,
2015), http://adlaw.jotwell.com/is-administrative-law-unlawful-no/ [http://perma.cc/D7ZZ-23RZ].

